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The Feres Doctrine
By

SmNEY B. JACOBY*

THE concept of sovereign immunity from suit is an important doctrine of American law. It was of special significance in the area of
torts where the old English maxim was that "the king could do no
wrong." Following earlier piecemeal legislation, the Federal Tort
Claims Act1 in 1946 constituted the culmination of efforts to subject
the executive branch of our government to tort suits. Difficulties in
the judicial construction of the consent statutes, especially in the tort
field, have plagued the courts for years. Hornbook law has it that
such statutes must be "strictly" construed, but sometimes the inter'2
pretation has been "liberal"and sometimes just "reasonable.
An inordinate number of Supreme Court opinions have been
rendered in the Tort Claims field, but of the various pronouncements
of the Supreme Court the opinion in Feres v United States3 occupies a
unique place. In its simplest form, Feres is a judge made exception
for plaintiffs who are injured "incident to service" while on active duty;
that is, by judicial interpretation of the Act, servicemen on active duty
cannot recover from the government under the Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained "incident to service." The article is written to update
and delineate the present scope of the Feres doctrine. This article will
consider how the Feres doctrine has been applied inrelation to (a) impleader actions, (b) suits against fellow servicemen individually and
(c) suits against private manufacturers of objects used by the armed
forces.
*

Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.

The author gratefully
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1. The Act is distributed m the Judiciary Code: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b),

1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b), 2412, and 2671-80 (1970).
2. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEnDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 1351-56 (2d ed. P Bator, P Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler 1973)
(Note on the interpretation of statutes consenting to suit).
3. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Feres and Related Fields
Before discussing the three significant developments in the law
mentioned above, it is instructive to see how Feres is a unique decision
in the interpretation of the Tort Claims Act over the years. To this
end, the following pages show how Feres is to be distinguished from
statutory exceptions to the Act, how it differs from a line of cases allowing recovery to servicemen sustaining injuries not "incident to service" and what the Supreme Court has done to the various rationales of
the Feres doctrine.
Initially, Feres must be distinguished from a series of cases interpreting exceptions built into the Act. For example, by its own provisions the Act exempts claims based on discretionary acts of government officials,4 misrepresentation by government agents' or acts occurring in a foreign situs. 6
The judge created exception of Feres must also be distinguished
from general statutory exceptions of other claimants. For instance,
Congress has explicitly excluded from the Act federal employees covered by the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA),7 employees
of post exchanges and officers' messes 8 and most employees of the District of Columbia which are similarly covered by the FECA. 9 Members
of the Reserve Officers Training Corps also are not entitled to sue under
the Act when injured in the line of duty, while engaged in authorized
travel or while attending training activities. 10 Members of the National Guard involved in military functions required by law are entitled to the same compensation benefits as the members of the armed
forces are," and on that basis have been denied recovery under the
Act. 2 This is true despite the fact that a military member of the
4. Chronologically, the cases interpreting this section range from Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), to Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61
(1955), Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) and Rayonier, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970), construed in United States v. Neustadt,
366 U.S. 696 (1961).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1970), construed in United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S.
217 (1949).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970).
8. Id. § 8173. For a discussion of the relationship between Feres and the statutory exemptions, see the recent case of Moyer v. Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585, 598 (5th
Cir. 1973).
9. Id. § 8101(1)(D). But see Wham v. United States, 180 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (members of the fire and police departments of the District of Columbia), followed in Bradshaw v. United States, 443 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 8140(a), (b) (1970).
11. 32 U.S.C. § 318 (1970).
12. Coletta v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 19, 21-22 (D.R.I. 1969).
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state National Guard is not considered a, government employee for
whom the government may be liable.' 3
As can be seen, in recent times Congress has been quite active in
this area. One point that deserves mentioning is that throughout
this period, though invited by the Supreme Court to do so, 14 Congress

took no action to change the Feres result; that is, no legislation has
been enacted that would give servicemen a claim under the Act for
injuries sustained "incident to service." This indicates, impliedly at
least, legislative acquiescence in the Feresdoctrine.

Feres was decided along with two companion cases, Jefferson v.
United States'5 and United States v. Griggs.' The common fact underlying each of these cases was that each claimant, a serviceman on active duty, sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed
In Feres the executrix of Feres sued to recover for death
forces.'
caused by negligence. The decedent had perished by fire in a barracks
while on active duty. Negligence was alleged in quartering him
in a barracks known, or which should have been known, to be unsafe
because of a defective heating plant, and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch. The district court dismissed the action and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that if more than the pension sysin militem had been contemplated to recompense soldiers engaged
8
tary service, Congress would have specifically provided for it.'
13. National Guard technicians, employees not engaged in military functions,
were specifically given the status of civilian federal employees under 32 U.S.C. § 709
(1970), so that pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970) such individuals may not recover as plaintiffs under the Tort Claims Act, but under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671 (1970) the government may be liable for their negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions.
14. 340 U.S. 135, at 138 (1950).
15. 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
16. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
17. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). In Jefferson, the plaintiff,
while in the army, was required to undergo an abdominal operation. Eight months
later, in the course of another operation after plaintiff was discharged, a towel 30
inches long by 18 inches wide, marked "Medical Department, U.S. Army," was discovered and removed from his stomach. The complaint alleged it was negligently left
there by the army surgeon. The district court concluded that the Tort Claims Act
does not charge the United States with liability in this type of case, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
In Griggs, the district court dismissed the complaint of Griggs' executrix, which
alleged that while on active duty he met death beacuse of negligent and unskillful
medical treatment by army surgeons. The Court of Appeals reversed and, one judge
dissenting, held that the complaint stated a cause of action under the Tort Claims Act.
18. 177 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1949). The court also recognized that the only
exception to this interpretation of the Tort Claims Act applied to situations where
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Jackson, speaking
for a unanimous court, denied recovery, holding that the Federal Tort
Claims Act does not extend its remedy to members of the United States
armed forces who sustain incident to their service what otherwise would
be an actionable wrong.1 9 With a veritable dearth of legislative history
on the issue, the court based its opinion on the rationales (a) that with
respect to military claimants, Congress had not been suffering from a
plague of private relief bills when enacting the Federal Tort Claims
Act; (b) that no new claim was created by the Act, rather the government merely became subject to existing private remedies; (c) that
no analogous private liability exists for the reason that private individuals do not engage in the business of conscription; (d) that the statutory rule making state law governing shows the inapplicability of the
Act to these cases since the relationship of the government to its servicemen is distinctively federal in nature; and (e) that the fact of a simple and uniform system of compensation for those in the armed forces
20
militates against application of the Tort Claims Act.
Thus, under the Feres doctrine, a member of the armed forces
who sustains an injury incident to his service due to negligence of another is without a judicial remedy, and he may look only to the statutory provisions regulating compensation of servicemen for duty-related injuries.21
The Feres decision is put in proper perspective when it is contrasted with Brooks v. United States,22 which the Supreme Court decided
one year before Feres. The Brooks decision granted recovery under
the Act to soldiers on furlough for injuries "not incident to their service," 23 and specifically reserved, and subsequently decided in Feres,
the issue whether injuries "incident to service" were cognizable under
the Act. The courts have experienced great difficulty in the FeresBrooks distinction and have used a variety of devices to make the "incident to service" distinction, sometimes reaching peculiar results.
One series of cases has denied recovery to servicemen while "onbase, '2 4 while another line of authority has denied recovery reasoning
military personnel were not on active duty. Id. See Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49 (1949).
19. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
20. Id. at 140-44.
21. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §§ 310-361, 610-627 (1970).
22. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
23. Id. at 52.
24. See, e.g., Orken v. United States, 239 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1956) (Feres applied to officer occupying on-base quarters with his family to defeat recovery); Coffey
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that but for the fact that the plaintiff was on active duty, he would not
have been exposed to the allegedly wrongful acts. 25 While the difficult question whether Brooks or Feres should be applied is significant, this article focuses on the subsequent development of the Feres
case.
Post Feres Decisions
Since Feres the Supreme Court has questioned the continued ef-

fectiveness of the various rationales of the Feres decision, although its
v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (no recovery for on-base accident even though soldier on liberty and driving car toward exit gate); Gursley v.
United States, 232 F. Supp. 614 (D. Colo. 1964) (no recovery for serviceman while
on three day pass when explosion destroyed his on-base family quarters). Contra,
Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
Conversely, the general principle that an off-base accident of a serviceman not
on military assignment may lead to recovery under the Tort Claims Act has its qualifications. See, e.g., Sapp v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957); Snyder
v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 585 (D. Md. 1953), modified on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Guyer, 218 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1954), district court decision reinstated, 350 U.S. 906 (1955) (injury sustained by soldier in his home off-base during
off duty hours).
When, although on leave, the soldier was a passenger on a military plane on a
space available basis, recovery has been denied. Fass v. United States, 191 F. Supp.
367 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). Recovery was permitted in the same accident, however, to a
retired officer who had obtained a ride for personal reasons. See Homlitas v. United
States, 202 F. Supp. 520 (D. Ore. 1962). Of course, no recovery is permitted if the
deceased soldier was on active military duty. United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d
272 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967).
Also, when a soldier on leave was hit by a government vehicle while talking to
military policemen it was held that there was liability if at the time of the accident
the soldier was simply invited to go back to base but not if at that time he was put
under military orders to return. Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
One of the many additional problems encountered was whether the Feres "military discipline" concept applied only if the tortfeasor-employee for whom the government allegedly was liable was of a higher rank than the injured serviceman. Mattos v.
United States, 412 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1969), held that the Feres doctrine was applicable even though both individuals were of equal rank.
25. See, e.g., Schwager v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The Schwager court fully discussed earlier decisions to demonstrate the "non-erosion
of Feres." It left undecided whether the "but for" test should be applied; that is, but
for his service status Schwager could not have been a patient in the naval hospital.
In Shults v. United States, 421 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1969), Feres was applied to a
sailor who had been struck by an automobile while on liberty and subsequently died
in a military hospital due to an alleged act of malpractice. Though the leave was
never formally cancelled before the sailor's death recovery was denied because he
"could not have been admitted, and would not have been admitted, to the Naval Hospital except for his military status." Id. at 171. See also Lowe v. United States,
440 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (1971); Buer v. United States,
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general validity has never been doubted. For example, the rationale of
Feres that "no new cause of action was created by the Act" seems to
have been negatived by the language in a more recent opinion in
which it was stated that the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to
establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability. 6 Similarly,
the reasoning in Feres that the existence of a simple and uniform compensation system militates against the application of the Tort Claims
Act was apparently abandoned in United States v. Brown2 7 where an
allegedly negligent operation was performed on a veteran which led to
an increase in the amount of his annuity for a prior service-connected
disability. Recovery under the Tort Claims Act was allowed, with the
court distinguishing the Feres situation by reasoning that in Feres
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims
Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty,28led the court to read the Act
as excluding claims of that character.
The Brown case, then, modifies the "incident to service" rationale of
Feres to mean only that which involves "general military discipline."
Furthermore, the more recent Supreme Court case of United States
v. Muinz,29 while not questioning the validity of Feresfor military plaintiffs, dissected the various reasons of Feres and found them inapplicable to prisoner plaintiffs. Since the various rationales of Feres were
of a general character-quite independent from the factual situations
of military plaintiffs-the limiting effect of the Muinz decision should
241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974 (1957).

But cf. Clark v.

United States, 402 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1968) (recovery for injury to wife of serviceman due to malpractice at army hospital); Hall v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1135,

1136 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
26. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).

Interestingly, in

his dissenting opinion in Rayonier Mr. Justice Reed referred to the Feres decision.
Id. at 321.
27. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
28. Id. at 112. In his dissent in Brown Mr. Justice Black, who would have de-

nied recovery, expressed the view that Feres, not the Brooks, opinion should have
been applied, it having been pointed out in Brooks, different
accident there had nothing to do with the 'army careers' of
neither caused by nor incident to their military service." Id.
scription of Feres, emphasizing the "uniform system" rationale,

from Feres, that "the
the soldiers and was
at 114. Another dewas supplied prior to

Brown by Mr. Justice Reed in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953):

"The

existence of a uniform compensation system for injuries to those belonging to the
armed services led us to conclude that Congress had not intended to depart from this
system and allow recovery by a tort action dependent on state law." Id. at 31 n.25.
29. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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be interpreted to weaken the continued effectiveness of the rationales
of Feres. The rationale of Feres that governmental liability does not
cover new causes of action was specifically repudiated by MuinzY0
Also, the presence of a compensation system, though found persuasive in Feres, was held by the court in Muinz, citing Brown, not to
preclude a negligence suit."' Moreover, the other reasons of Feres
(for example, the problem of applying diverse state law and possible
damage to prison discipline) were brushed aside in Muinz.3 2 By its

broad language the Court weakened those rationales of Feres.3 Accordingly, the ideas of "novelty of relief," of a "uniform system" of
compensation, of "difficulty of applying state law," and to some extent, of "discipline" no longer are clearly valid rationales. Rather, the

later Supreme Court opinions such as Muinz should be read as simply
continuing to exclude from coverage military plaintiffs, broadly sub-

ject to military discipline, who seek recovery for wrongs sustained "incident to service.

'34

The preceding discussion illustrates some of the problems which
arose when an attempt was made to apply the Feres doctrine to vari-

ous fact situations. It is now generally recognized that Feres is a well
established but limited doctrine excluding from coverage under the Tort

Claims Act military plaintiffs, broadly subject to military discipline,
who seek recovery for wrongs sustained "incident to service."
Applications of the Feres Doctrine
The remainder of this article discusses the difficulties which seem
30.

Id. at 159.

31.

Id. at 160.

32. Id. at 161-63.
33. Thus, in answer to the argument that the government would be judged under
too many standards the Court stated: 'This seems more a matter of conjecture than
of reality, . . . Even a matter such as improper medical treatment can be judged
under the varying state laws of malpractice without violent dislocation of prison routine." (Id. at 161-62). Such statements can be made to the same effect regarding
servicemen.
34. No discussion of Feres is found in United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149
(1966) where, distinguishing Muniz, it was held that the Tort Claims Act cannot be
invoked by a prisoner injured while performing an assigned prison task, the injury being covered by compensation benefits under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970). The Court
held that 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970) was the exclusive remedy, in line with the historical
doctrine that workmen's compensation statutes are "substitutes for, not supplements
to, common-law tort actions." Id. at 151. The Feres opinion was mentioned only in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White which suggested that the compensation
system of federal prisoners under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970) was not like the "simple,
certain, and uniform" compensation system described in Feres. Id. at 155; see also
Logue v. United States, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 2215 (1973).
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to exist with respect to certain applications of the Feres rule. Those situations basically fall into three categories: (a) whether Feres
should prevent an impleader against the government by a private
party-defendant who is being sued by a plaintiff disqualified under
Fefres to sue the government directly; (b) whether a person disqualified under Feres should in every case be precluded from suing an
individual government employee personally for negligence; and (c)
whether a person disqualified under Feres should be precluded from
suing the manufacturer in a products liability situation even though
the government may have to bear the ultimate burden of the recovery.
Impleader
Suits under the Tort Claims Act may be brought not only in the
form of regular suits by the injured party against the government but
also by means of a third party complaint. The defendant in the private litigation may implead the government under Rule 14(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the theory that under the Tort Claims
Act the government "is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." In its original form the Tort Claims
Act did not specify whether claims could be so brought, but in
United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 5 the Supreme Court ruled that the government may be so impleaded.3 6 The 1966 amendment of the Tort
Claims Act codified and modified that practice by requiring generally
that an administrative claim be filed before instituting court action. The statute expressly provides, however, that no such prior administrative claim shall be required when the claim against the government is asserted by way of a third party complaint.3
Some general observations on impleader involving the government are appropriate. 8 Whether under Federal Rule 14 the government can be impleaded is dependent upon the applicable state law for
contribution or indemnity.30 Even though the rule is not universal,
apparently most state jurisdictions recognize indemnity and contribu35.

340 U.S. 543 (1951).

36. Id. at 556-57.
37. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 2, 80 Stat. 306, amending
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1970). The significance of the 1966 amendments to the Tort
Claims Act is discussed in Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67
COLUm. L. REV. 1212 (1967).
38. It should be recognized that in this general discussion we are concerned
with impleader against the government, separate and distinct from Tort Claims Act
actions.
39. See, e.g., Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d
368, 369 (10th Cir. 1954).
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tion causes of action, 40 and no general provision of the Tort Claims
Act prevents or limits such impleader. 41 On the other hand, specifically with respect to the government's right to implead, occasionally
federal, not state law, governs; thus despite contrary state law, impleader by the United States has sometimes been permitted.42
Regardless of these general impleader provisions the question arises
whether a private party defendant may implead the government in a suit
by a Feres-disqualifiedplaintiff. In other words, can a Feres-disqualifled plaintiff do indirectly what he could not do directly?
An analogous situation is found for employees covered by the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA). By statute FECA
covered employees are precluded from filing tort claims against the
government. 43 Apparently the policy behind this statute is the idea of
a "uniform system of compensation," that the employees should not
derive additional benefits for the same act. The purpose of this statute
is accomplished by providing that an FECA-covered employee who
recovers for the same injury from a private tortfeasor is required to refund the amount of his benefits to the government.44 Disallowing
impleader against the government in such a situation, however, would
40. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 875(c) (West Supp. 1972) specifies that the
right of contribution "may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has, by payment, dis.
charged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof." See
Gottlieb, The Tort Claims Act Revisited, 49 Gao. L.J. 539, 547-48 (1961); Gottlieb,
Some Aspects of Contribution and Indemnity in Tort Actions against the United
States, 9 FED. B.J. 391, 397 (1948).
41. But cf. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). Gilman presented
an unusual instance of "judicial law-making in the negative." The case involved impleader by, not against, the government and the person to be impleaded was the individual government employee-tortfeasor for whom the government was liable. While
generally permitting impleader by the government, the Supreme Court in Gilman refused to follow general private law principles of the master-servant relationship because it saw policy considerations and deferred to Congress the power to decide
whether a right of indemnity should be recognized.
42. In Crocker-Citizens National Bank v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 673 (E.D.
Cal. 1970), where in a contractual suit against the United States for the death of an
employee of a government contractor the United States was permitted to bring a third
party indemnity action against the contractor, although the contract did not contain
an express indemnification provision, as was required by California state law. CAL.
LABOR CODE § 3864 (West 1971). Federal law was held to apply because the contract was formed under the authority of federal law, the relationship of the parties
was federal in character and the uniform treatment of federal contracts was deemed
necessary. Id. at 675. Under federal law an express agreement by the manufacturer
to conduct its work in a safe manner was held sufficient despite the absence of an
express hold harmless clause. See id. at 675-76.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970).
44. Id. at § 8132.
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not result in implementing the policy that the government employees
not reap improper advantages; rather, the result would be that the private tortfeasor would suffer undue losses. Thus, if an FECA-covered
employee were to obtain $15,000 as benefits under the statute, and
were to recover $20,000 for the tort of a private tortfeasor, the employee would have to repay $15,000 to the government. The private tortfeasor thus would bear the entire loss even though under state
law he might be entitled to indemnity from the government. Consequently, to prevent an unfair burden on private defendants, impleader
should be permitted in FECA situations.
There is some authority for not permitting such impleader or a
separate suit,4 5 but a number of cases have permitted recovery.4 6 For
instance, in Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States,4" an admiralty case under the Public Vessels Act,48 it was held in a suit by
the private shipowner who paid an injured government employee
that the protective provision of the FECA did not affect the divided
damage rule of admiralty in mutual fault collisions and, therefore, did
not free the government of liability. 49 A subsequent case, Treadwell
Construction Co. v. United States,50 was an action against the United
States by a government contractor who had been liable to a federal
employee who, in his relationship to the government, was restricted to
FECA benefits. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
suit against the United States, 5 ' and the Supreme Court vacated that decision for further consideration in light of Weyerhaeuser.5 2 Cases
not permitting liability of the United States in the case of an FECA45.

E.g., Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 347 (Ist Cir.

1969) (action brought by private tortfeasor against the United States following settlement of the suit against him); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 402-04
(9th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1964) (an impleader action). The factual situation in Newport may be compared with the facts in the recent decision in Barr v.
Brezina Construction Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973). See text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.

46. E.g., Wallenius Bremen G. m.b. H. v. United States, 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (separate action); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
United States, 331 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (separate action); Hart v. Simons,
223 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1963)

(impleader action); cf. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v.

United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963); Treadwell Constr. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
772 (1963).
47. 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
48. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1970).
49. 372 US.. at 600.
50.

372 U.S. 772 (1963).

51. Drake v. Treadwell Constr. Co., 299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1962).
52.

372 U.S. 772 (1963).

Mk~ay 1973]

THE FERES DOCTRINE

1291

covered employee distinguished the Weyerhaeuser case on the ground
that it was an admiralty case and emphasized that the Treadwell case
did not actually allow recovery but merely vacated the court of appeals decision for further consideration.5" Cases reaching the opposite conclusion found a more general approach in the Supreme Court
pronouncements and emphasized that in speaking of the exclusionary
provisions of the FECA the Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser noted
there is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned with the
rights of unrelated third parties.5 4 Also, upon remand by the Supreme Court in Treadwell, the district court permitted the impleader;
an appeal was taken, but later was dismissed because the Solicitor General recommended against appealing the decision unfavorable to the
55
government.
Such policy considerations also seem to be particularly applicable
to the Feres situation. The Feres exception is clearly a "judge-made'
rule, and the only rationale of that doctrine still maintainable in light
of the gradual development of that doctrine is the "general military discipline" concept.5" Neither that rationale, nor any of the previously
advanced rationales, seem to support a conclusion excluding a private
tortfeasor from recovering indemnity to which he would normally be
entitled from the government. In a way the result would seem to be
even more cogent in the Feres situation than in that of an FECA-covered employee.5 7 In the latter situation we have to consider the statu5
tory provision excluding tort claims by FECA-covered employees 8
and to that extent conclusions, although possibly unjustified, may be
drawn from the statutory language. In the Feres situation we arb
concerned only with a judge made principle and it should be easier to
adjust judicially that principle to the peculiar factual situation. However, until recently impleader against the government in suits by a
Feres-disqualified plaintiff has been denied.
53. E.g., Busey v. Washington, 225 F. Supp. 416, 421 (D.D.C. 1964).
54. 372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963). This factor was emphasized in Hart v. Simons,
223 F. Supp. 109, 110-11 (E.D. Pa. 1963), and the recent case of Barr v. Brezina
Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
55. For a description of the later history of the Treadwell case see Hart v.
Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109, 111 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1963), and Travelers Ins. Co. v. United
States, 331 F. Supp. 189, 191 (E.D.Pa. 1971).
56. See text accompanying notes 19-34 supra.
57. But cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 402, 404 (9th Cir.
1964), where apparently impleader was disapproved with respect to both FECA-covered employees and Feres-covered soldiers, though in the case of the FECA-covered
employees not on the basis of the statute.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1970).
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In United States Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,5 9 involving a collision between a commercial airplane and a United States Air Force jet, actions
against the commercial airline were brought under the Nevada wrongful death statute by the decedents of two servicemen who had been
passengers on the commercial plane. To that extent the impleader of
the government was dismissed for the reason that the government is
not liable under the Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen whose
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. 0° Drumgoole v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.6 involved suits
by reserve members of the armed forces on active training duty instituted against a power company. The latter sought to implead the
United States for contribution and indemnity. Relying on Virginia
law and the Feres doctrine the court granted the motion to dismiss the
third party claim, for the reasons that under Virginia law contribution
from a co-tortfeasor is withheld if he cannot be held liable to the original plaintiff, and that the act of the government toward the Feres-covered soldier was a negligence which was not actionable."2
A later case in the State of Virginia based its holding disallowing
impleader of the government more exclusively on the Feres doctrine,
even though it cited the Drumgoole opinion. In Keisel v. Buckeye Donkey Ball, Inc.,63 a third party complaint of defendant against the
United States was dismissed on the ground that the third party plaintiff
stands in no different posture with regard to any claim against the
United States than would the plaintiff had he instituted a direct action
against the government. 4
However, a more recent decision adopted the analogous reason59. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
60. Id. at 384, 404.
61. 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1952).
62. Id. at 826. The Virginia statute provides: "Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced when the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no
moral turpitude." VA. COD ANN. § 8-627 (1957). Additionally the court based its
holding on the broad ground that under the Tort Claims Act the government is liable
only for certain tort claims, so that, even if the contribution claim was regarded independently of the original wrong, there could be no liability of the government here.
170 F. Supp. at 826.
63. 311 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. Va. 1970).
64. Id. at 370-71. In Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 277 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa.
1967), the court disallowed impleader for contribution, relying on the Feres doctrine
and also citing the Drumgoole and the Wiener cases. On the other hand, the court
in Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970) allowed an indemnity
claim against the government, which had intervened as party plaintiff, after judgment,
under the Medical Care Recovery Act, pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by all parties and approved by the court. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1970).
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ing of the FECA situation in Treadwel 5 and Weyerhaeuser0 and
recognized that impleader is not barred in the Feres situation. In Barr
v. Brezina Construction Co. 6 7 the court squarely held:
[I]t does not follow that a defendant-third-party plaintiff who has
been subjected to liability by a serviceman inherits, so to speak, the
limitations which apply to the serviceman, since his is an independent remedy based on different considerations.68
The Barr case involved a Feres-covered serviceman who had recovered
$45,000 in settlement of a claim for personal injuries allegedly caused
by the negligence of Brezina Construction Company and its subcontractor, the Nielsen Scott Company. The plaintiff had fallen down an
access stairway installed by Nielsen in a building on an air force base
in Utah. The case initially involved the issue of whether a Feres-covered serviceman may recover from the manufacturer of an object used
by the military."9 The Barr court of appeals decision ruled that impleader is not barred in the Feres situation. The Barr court referred
to the Supreme Court cases of Weyerhaeuser and Treadwell" and
added thereto Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp.,71 an admiralty case. The
Barr court recognized that the Supreme Court has not spoken on impleader under the Feres principle, but wisely permitted impleader,
stating, "The reasoning of the Ryan body of law appears applicable
' T2
so that a party seeking indemnity is not barred at the threshold.
Clearly the conclusion reached in Barr that impleader of the government is possible in a suit by a Feres-disqualified plaintiff is a result
that should be adopted for the benefit of the military plaintiff and the
third party tortfeasor.
Feres and Suits Against Fellow Servicemen
The broad brush of the Feres doctrine encompasses all suits "incident to service"; apparently, the best rationale for excluding such
suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act is the maintenance of general
military discipline. However, this broad language covers a multitude
of sins. Many situations in the military merely duplicate their counterpart in civilian life for which the rationale of maintaining discipline
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See note 50 supra.
See note 47 supra.
464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
Id. at 1143 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
See notes 47-55 supra.
350 U.S. 124 (1956).
464 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 1972).
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is of dubious significance. A striking illustration is the medical services that are rendered to servicemen while on active duty.
This section will discuss the Feres doctrine as it applies to medical malpractice suits by members of the armed forces against militaary
doctors.
While the courts may be divided on the impleader situation as
it applies to Feres, there does not seem to be any conflict with respect
to the problem of whether a Feres-covered soldier can bring a negligence
action against another soldier individually who may be his superior.
In the Feres opinion, Justice Jackson, when discussing the requirement
of the Tort Claims Act that the United States' liability be like that
of a "private individual", stated specifically that he knew of no
American law permitting a soldier to recover for negligence, against
either his superior officer or the government. 3
It is primarily on the basis of this dictum that recovery was denied
in two cases involving one plaintiff, an enlisted man who sued army
medical surgeons for malpractice in an operation performed in an
army hospital. In the first of these cases, brought in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff, Bailey, sued two army surgeons for alleged medical
malpractice. The suit against one of the doctors was dismissed for lack
of personal jurisdiction and the other was dismissed on the ground that
a soldier has no claim against an army surgeon because "[i]t is not
yet within the American legal concept that one soldier may sue another
for negligent acts performed in the line of duty."7 In the second case,
brought in the Third Circuit, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit was
followed and the suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim for
75

relief.

No other decisions relating to this issue are available. It should
be noted, however, that (1) Mr. Justice Jackson's dictum in Feres did not
say that American law has disallowed such claims but merely that he
knew of no American law which permitted such suits; (2) intentional tort suits against fellow soldiers have been allowed in American
practice; 76 (3) Mr. Justice Jackson's dictum was set forth in connec73. 340 U.S. at 141 (dictum).
74. Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 948 (1966).
75. Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 241 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1965), a! 'd 375 F.2d 72
(3d Cir. 1967).
76. In addition to the two cases cited in Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 n.10, Dinsman v.
Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851) (false imprisonment action instituted in federal court), and Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), see Hickey v. Huse,
56 Me. 493 (1896) (a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine allowing a
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tion with a portion of the Feres opinion refuting the contention that
no new claim was created under the Act (which, incidentally, was
largely repudiated by the later development of the Feres doctrine in
the Supreme Court);7 7 and (4) the remaining rationale of the Feres
doctrine, that of military discipline, can hardly be deemed to justify
precluding medical malpractice suits against army doctors individually.
It should also be noted that other causes of action are now permitted that have a far greater effect on the maintenance of general
military discipline and the special relation of the soldier to his superiors. For example, military discipline is much more clearly endangered by false imprisonment actions against commanding officers78 than by suits for medical malpractice. Whether any interference with discipline may be created by suits for medical malpractice,
such interference, probably cannot to any significant extent be discerned in malpractice suits against army surgeons 79 who, more likely
than not, are insured by medical liability insurance. Basically, the
question should be answered not from the possible absence of precedents, but rather from a consideration of the general law concerning
the liability of individual government officers. In this respect, at least,
medical malpractice suits against army surgeons individually should
be permitted.
It is a postulate of American law that government agents are liable for their torts and that the immunity from suit possessed by the government is not shared by its agents. 0 Of course, there are exceptions
to this general principle. Perhaps the broadest exception to this general rule is the defense of privilege.,, The nature of this defense was
most eloquently described by Judge Learned Hand in his frequently
quoted statement in Gregoire v. Biddle,82 a suit brought against two
trespass suit for false imprisonment by a private in the army against another soldier);
compare McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235 (D. Cal. 1867) (civilian's suit against
commanding officer for illegal arrest and false imprisonment), with Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. 110 (1855) (private citizens, in an admiralty action, suing the commander of a U.S. ship individually because of confiscation). With respect to suits
against manufacturers see text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
77. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Compare United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
80.

D. ScHWARTZ & S. JAcony, LrIGAT ON wrr

THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT

§ 16.115, at 287 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ScnwAwrz & JACOBY].
81. Id. § 16.116, at289-91.
82. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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attorneys general personally for malicious conspiracy to imprison the
plaintiff under the alien enemy control laws:
There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who
have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter
from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. . . In this instance it has
been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done
by dishonest officers than to subject83those who try to do their duty
to the constant dread of retaliation.
This judge-made doctrine owes its origin to the theory of privilege of
judicial officers. It has been applied by the courts mainly in willful
tort cases, not in negligence suits for medical malpractice. 84 In a malpractice suit there is no question whether the commission of the wrong
was done by a dishonest officer or whether there was an honest mistake. Medical malpractice is not an act of government administration
as such; rather, the cause of action is based on professional standards
independent of either the military or the government.
Instead of being a claim justifying the defense of privilege, a
medical malpractice suit by a soldier against an army medical officer
remains a normal negligence suit to which the general rules should
apply. Tort suits against government officers generally are not affected
by the presence or absence of relief against the United States. Express statutory language is necessary in order to preclude suits
against individual government officers.
The Federal Tort Claims Act has precluded such suits in certain instances. For instance, the statute provides that the recovery of a
judgment under the Act bars a suit against the government employee for
whose negligence the United States was held liable.85 But it is the
judgment under the Act which is a bar, not the institution of the ac83. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (conspiracy to seize
property); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (libel); Romeo v. United States,
462 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1972) (damage suit against Administrator of Small Business
Administration personally for having rescinded a disaster loan); Skolnick v. Campbell,
454 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1971) (suit against a judge, alleging that he prevented plaintiffs from appearing as grand jury witnesses); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3rd Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972) (suit against U.S. Attorney for conspiracy
to violate civil and constitutional rights); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.
1971), reversed on other grounds sub nonz. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
418 (1973) (suit against police officers personally for assault and battery); Frommhagen v. Glazer, 442 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972)
(libel action against a NASA employee for circulating a memorandum to persons
within the agency).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1970).
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tion. In other words, the creation of the statutory remedy against the
United States is no bar to an action against the individual government
employee. Nor is such a bar brought about by merely suing the United
States. Accordingly, actions may be instituted jointly against the
United States and the individual government employee. In fact, it has
been specifically stated that while a Tort Claims Act judgment against
the United States constitutes a bar to an action against the individual
officer, the reverse is not true. In other words, a judgment first
the United States
against the employee is no bar to an action against
6
though, of course, no double recovery is allowed.
Only when Congress specifically so legislates are tort suits against
the individual government employee excluded.8 7 For instance, since
1962 the Tort Claims Act remedy against the United States has been
made exclusive in cases involving "the operation by any employee of
the Government of any motor vehicle."' 8 Thereafter, in 1965, the
question of abolishing medical malpractice suits against government
medical personnel was before Congress. It is significant that the resulting legislation excluded only the right to sue medical personnel of
The legislative history of the 1965
the Veterans Administration.'
amendment of this provision makes it clear that its purpose was to establish an exclusion similar to that of motor vehicle operators. 0
In view of all these considerations the law should recognize the
permissibility of medical malpractice suits against army surgeons by
Feres-covered soldiers. The most cogent consideration in support of
this result is that by very detailed legislation Congress has abolished
suits only against medical personnel of the Veterans Administration.
Nothing comparable was done by Congress with respect to the medical
personnel of the Defense Department. Under established principles of
statutory construction 91 it would seem that the medical personnel of
the Defense Department should not receive the statutory exclusion from
suit.
86. Moon v. Price, 213 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954); Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp.
764, 766 (E.D.N.Y.1963).
87. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2676, 2679 (1970); SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note
80, § 16.115, at 288-89.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b); SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note 80, § 13.112, at 210.
By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970) a non-jury trial under the Act is substituted for
the previously existing right to jury trial in the claim against the individual.
89. See 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a) (1970).
90. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3927-28.
91. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (The inclusion of one is the exclusion of
another). J.SUTHERLAND, 3 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5822, at 117
(1943).
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This is particularly true in view of the fact that the opposite result produces strange results. Both veterans and soldiers, when they
are the victims of medical malpractice, would in a proper case receive
statutory disability benefits. The veteran, however, would not have
a claim against the doctor individually; rather he would have a claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2 On the other hand, depriving the
Feres-covered soldier of a claim against the doctor personally would
mean that he would have neither claim. Hence, it seems proper to
grant him the right to sue the army doctor personally. 3
The question will be raised as to how far individual suits against
army personnel should be permitted. Allowing medical malpractice
suits against army doctors need not imply a general inroad upon a rule
of non-liability for negligent acts. The 1965 Congressional history is
the only insight available for making inferences regarding legislative
intent. That intent appears to leave malpractice suits against Defense
Department medical personnel subject to general tort law. Furthermore, medical malpractice suits will have little or no effect on general
military discipline or the relation of the soldier to his superior,
whereas such a result might obtain from suits against non-medical superior officers.
As a matter of public policy, suits should be allowed against
active duty medical personnel. As mentioned earlier, medical malpractice seems different from other negligent acts of a military character in that the medical duty of the army surgeon is primarily a
professional duty, that of the medical profession. In a significant way
the standards of malpractice are determined not by army regulations
but generally by pre-existing requirements of the medical profession.
It should follow, then, that the liability of a medical officer for malpractice be analogous to that of his civilian counterpart, and not affected by the concept of general military discipline.
Suits Against Manufacturers of Objects Used by the Military
The Feres doctrine has also found application outside the realm
of the serviceman-government relationship. The Feres concept of
governmental immunity from suits by servicemen injured incident to
their service has been invoked by nongovernmental entities as well
92. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
93. It should also be noted that the cases permitting a Feres-covered soldier to
sue the manufacturers of objects used by the military under state law demonstrate that
personal liability to a Feres-covered soldier is not unknown. See Note, 22 HASTINGS

L.J. 400 (1971).
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as by the United States. On numerous occasions, Feres-covered servicemen have sued the manufacturers of objects causing injury to service-

Some courts have allowed the actions, based on state law,94

men.

for cases of negligence95 and breach of warranty. 6 Suits have also
been allowed where the plaintiff was the representative 9 7 or the widow9" of deceased servicemen.

Any broad assertion that a radical reevaluation of the Feres doctrine is necessary in order to justify suits by servicemen against manu-

facturers seems unwarranted. Over the years, the rationales of Feres
were modified. °9
The right of a Feres-covered soldier to sue a manufacturer under
applicable state law, whether for strict liability, breach of warranty
or negligence, is now developing.

Summary
The Feres doctrine occupies a special place among the various interpretations of the Tort Claims Act. Different from other cases, Feres
was not concerned with the interpretation of a specific clause of the
94. E.g., O'Keefe v. Boeing Company, 335 F. Supp. 1104, 1111 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). In Paris v. General Electric Co., 54 Misc. 2d 310, 282 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup.
Ct. 1967), affd mem., 29 App. Div. 939, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1968), the administratrix of U.S. Air Force pilot who had died while on active duty brought wrongful death
action both on the basis of negligence and of breach of implied warranty against aircraft engine manufacturer. On the basis of applicable state law a motion to dismiss
was denied as to both causes of action, the court not even mentioning the Feres
principle.
95. E.g., Whitaker v. Howell-Kilgore Corporation, 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1969), petition for rehearing denied, 424 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1970); Boeing Airplane
Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd sub nom. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841; Note, 22
HASTINGS

LJ. 400, 409 (1971).

The material discussed in the

HASTNGs

note should

be placed into proper context with our discussion of the development of the various
Feres rationales and recent more doubtful applications of the Feres doctrine. See text
accompanying notes 26-34 supra. Perhaps nonapplication of the Feres doctrine can be
justified without the necessity of radically re-evaluating the doctrine, as the note suggests. See, also, Barr v. Brezina Construction Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
96. E.g., Sevits v. McKieman-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
affd sub nom. Montgomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968). See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1247 (1971).
97. E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
98. E.g., Ulmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 380 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.
1967).
99. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
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Act; rather, it was decided by a process of judicial lawmaking, seeking
to fit the Act into the entire statutory system of remedies against the
government to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole. 10 0
A comparison between the "whittling away" process of some of
the other cases interpreting the Act and the judicial development of the
judge made Feres rule demonstrates how the latter rule assumed
an "independent life" as an exclusionary rule. 1' 1 On the basis of that
independent life the Feres exemption was sought to be applied to
However, not by judicial
other, completely non-military situations. 20
lawmaking but rather by specific legislation outside the Tort Claims
Act, Congress has excluded certain persons from recovery under the
100. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142-80 (1921), in
which Cardozo explains the development of a judge-made "principle, henceforth isolated," and of its transformation into "a new entity, which in turn develops of itself
• . . to give it an independent life." Id. at 145.
It is interesting to note that in his discussion of the life of judge-made law Cardozo compares the French code system with American common law but, surprisingly,
in the field of governmental responsibility in tort the tables just happen to be reversed:
the American system is the code system while the French law is a complete system of
judge-made case law of the character of common law. See Jacoby, Federal Tort
Claims Act and French Law of Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, 7
VAND. L. REv. 246, 250 (1954). See id. at 256, 257 concerning the development of a
Feres-like principle in the French judge-made law, excluding from tort recovery soldiers
who are covered by special laws providing for pensions and disability benefits.
101. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which interpreted the second
portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970), the "exclusionary" clause of the Tort Claims
Act, has been gradually whittled away by subsequent rulings, by a process of judicial
development succinctly described by Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in
In Dalehite the Supreme Court had
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 811 (1972).
ruled in interpreting the "discretionary function" exception that the government shall
not be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental nature or function.
346 U.S. at 28. The court also held that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable, id.
at 36, and that the Act did not create new causes of action where none existed before,
id. at 43.
All these wide-ranging interpretations of the "discretionary function"
clauses were abandoned by the Supreme Court in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955), and Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
A further problem of interpretation, caused by the whittling away of Dalehite, was
referred to in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Laird v. Nelms, namely the
problem discussed by the court of appeals as to when a function is to be considered an
"operational" function-where liability exists-and when it is considered to be a "policy"
function-where the "discretionary function" exception still applies. 406 U.S. at 811.
102. As we have seen, the attempt to rely on Feres in order to preclude prisoners
from recovery under the Tort Claims Act failed. The Supreme Court specifically
stated that "we find no occasion to question Feres, as far as military claims are
concerned, the reasons for that decision are not compelling here." United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159 (1963).
Similarly, despite attempts to make the Feres
doctrine applicable, the claims of veterans were held not to be excluded from the
Federal Tort Claims Act in United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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Act.10 3 With respect to soldiers on active duty, the congressional silence of over twenty years has sanctioned the judge-made rule of law
in Feres. It appears that by judicial lawmaking the Supreme Court
has read another exception into the statutory catalogue of "exceptions' 10 4 from the Tort Claims Act by exempting any claim of a soldier for damages sustained incident to military service. 10 5
Thus, considering the Feres principle as a judge-made rule and
an additional exception under the Tort Claims Act, certain valuable
guidelines are supplied for the more doubtful situations previously discussed.' 0 0 For example, recognition of the independent life of the judge
made Feres rule as an exclusionary rule excluding only the victims of
governmental torts or plaintiffs under the Tort Claims Act justifies an
impleader of the United States by a subsidiary tortfeasor 0 7 Similarly, it should be more fully realized that Feres is applicable only to
suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States.
Feres should find no application in suits against fellow servicemen
for medical malpractice,"0 " nor should it bar recovery in suits against
the private manufacturer of objects involved in an accident. 0 9
Despite its limited effect the Feres opinion remains to be a
most interesting instance of judicial lawmaking. It evidences great
imagination and is an outstanding example of an exalted judicial process.

103.

See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.

104.

28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970).

105. For some of the difficulties encountered by the lower courts in applying the
judge-made Feres rule see text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 35-72 supra, for discussion of whether to permit
certain impleader suits against the United States. See text accompanying notes 73-93
supra, for discussion of whether to permit medical malpractice suits against fellow medical officers. See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra, for discussion f whether to
permit suits by soldiers against the private manufacturers of objects used by the military.
107. On the other hand, the "independent life" of the Feres doctrine likewise
justifies the opposite result in a somewhat similar situation, namely that of subrogated
insurance companies, which have insured property of a Feres-covered soldier, being
excluded from suit under the Tort Claims Act, for the insurance companies are mere

successors-at-law of the Feres-barred claimant.

See, e.g., United States v. United

Services Auto. Ass'n, 238 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1956); Preferred Insurance Co. v.
United States, 222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 837 (1955), rehearing
denied, 351 U.S. 990 (1956); Rivera-Grau v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 394 (D.N.M.

1971).
108.

See text accompanying notes 73-93 supra.

109.

See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.

